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Abstract: Using a discrete choice experiment with real economic incentives, this 
paper studies how food fiscal policies and external influences (such as pestering and 
information) can affect parental choice of food for their child. Using pairs of a parent 
and child, the experimental design varies the food prices of healthier and unhealthier 
alternatives of food products for children as part of specific food fiscal policies. We 
then examine the interplay of children’s pester power as well as information about the 
fiscal policies. The results from our lab experiment suggest that (a) implementing a fat 
tax and a subsidy simultaneously can shift parental behavior to healthier food 
products to a greater degree than a fat tax or a subsidy alone, (b) providing 
information regarding the food fiscal policies can further increase the impact of the 
intervention, and (c) child pestering is one of the causes of the moderate effectiveness 
of the policies as it strongly affects parents in making unhealthier choices.   
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1 Introduction  
Overconsumption and excessive intake of sugar and fats along with sedentary 
lifestyles have been partly blamed for the worldwide obesity prevalence trend. 
Individual food choices are influenced by a wide variety of biological and 
environmental variables. Biological variables include hunger, taste, and appetite, 
while environmental variables include economic determinants (cost, availability, and 
income), social determinants (socio-cultural status, meal patterns, peer and social 
networks), psychological determinants (mood, stress, guilt) and perceived nutrition 
determinants (knowledge about food, beliefs, attitudes) (The European Food 
Information Council (EUFIC), 2005). Individuals place different levels of importance 
on each of these dimensions.  
However, when transferring this framework from adults to children, an additional 
dimension must be taken into account. The food environment created by parents for 
children likely plays a more important role. This is because although adults have the 
freedom to make their own choices regarding energy intake and expenditure, the 
child’s choice set is limited by the environment created by their parents (Barlow and 
Dietz, 1998). In this respect, Cawley (2006) stresses that parental control and bounded 
rationality are of great importance for childhood obesity. Thus, nudging parents 
toward healthier behavior could play an important role in helping children develop 
healthy eating habits at a young age. This is very important given the evidence that 
habits are formed early on in life and are retained throughout adulthood (Kelder et al., 
1994; Resnicow et al., 1988; Singer et al., 1995). Therefore, interventions that focus 
on parental food choice behavior may help in this regard.  
Due to the substantial negative externalities for society involving increasing obesity 
rates, several governments worldwide have intervened with various policies with the 
goal of influencing dietary habits. These include but are not limited to fiscal (OECD, 
2012), marketing/informational (Beaudoin et al., 2007; Maes et al., 2012), and 
educational policies (Cross-Government Obesity Unit, 2008; New York City 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 2008) that aim to encourage people to 
make healthier food choices. In the respective literature, fiscal policies (i.e., those that 
limit access and provide price incentives and disincentives) have received great 
attention with respect to their effectiveness in improving dietary patterns (Thow et al., 
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2010). Generally, three types of price strategies have been applied: increasing 
unhealthy food prices (fat tax), decreasing healthy food prices (often called a thin 
subsidy) and a combination of both (Waterlander et al., 2012).  
However, the literature provides contradictory results on the efficacy of these policies 
as a health intervention tool. In fact, although fiscal policies may encourage people to 
make healthier choices, they may not be sufficient in themselves to alter long-term 
overall purchasing behavior. This is because any reduction in purchases of taxed 
products may be offset by the consumption of calories from other sources (Fletcher et 
al., 2010). The results from a number of studies suggest that increasing the price of a 
good through taxation or decreasing its price through subsidy could be an effective 
means of shifting food consumption away from unhealthy food toward healthier 
alternatives, not only among adults (Andreyeva et al., 2010; Dong and Lin, 2009; 
Epstein et al., 2012; French, 2003; Goldman et al., 2011; Powell and Chaloupka, 
2009; Waterlander et al., 2012) but also among young children and adolescents 
(French et al., 2001; French et al., 2003; Hannan et al., 2002).      
The evidence on the effectiveness of health related food price incentives and 
disincentives is from three sources: natural experiments, controlled trials of price 
changes in closed environments, and modeling studies (Mytton et al., 2012). To our 
knowledge, there are only a handful of studies that performed controlled experiments 
over food purchases under different fiscal policies, and these studies have several 
caveats. For example, two such studies (Epstein et al., 2010; Nederkoorn et al., 2011) 
lack enforcement of real monetary incentives because both the purchases and the 
budget for the purchases were hypothetical. An additional set of studies (Epstein et 
al., 2006; Epstein et al., 2007) lacks sufficient statistical power because they 
employed small sample sizes (10 and 47 couples of mother-child). Our emphasis on 
experimental economics research is based on the fact that causal knowledge requires 
controlled variation. The laboratory can mimic real-world markets and simultaneously 
allow tight control of decision environments in ways that are hard to duplicate using 
naturally occurring settings, and hence, it can isolate factors that affect human 
behavior.    
Our aim in this study is to identify some factors, either inside or outside the home 
environment, that can either weaken or enhance the expected outcomes of fiscal 
policies on food choices, through a controlled laboratory experiment. First, our 
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experiment contributes to the literature by providing an empirical examination of 
parent choices between healthier and unhealthier alternatives in regard to food 
products for their children under different fiscal pricing policies. While nutritional 
considerations are the most important determinants of parental food purchasing 
decisions, the preferences of their children are the second most important determinant 
of parental food choice (Spungin, 2004). Thus, we also evaluate how factors such as 
the provision of information on fiscal policies and child pestering may influence 
parental food choices.  
While there is an extensive literature on the impact of information on demand for 
food, there is scant literature on the causal effect of information on the effectiveness 
of food fiscal policies. It is well established that information can help consumers 
better evaluate the value of goods and services they are interested in, resulting in more 
appropriate purchases. It can also significantly help buyers to choose which market to 
participate in, and it can affect the elasticity of demand (Johnson and Myatt, 2006; 
Lewis, 2011; Tadelis and Zettelmeyer, 2011). Ashraf et al. (2013) examined 
information and subsidy as complements in health interventions and found that 
information can significantly increase the impact of price subsidies on purchases of 
healthy products (the impact of price subsidies was 60% larger among the informed 
households). 
In addition to our knowledge, this is the first study to examine children’s power 
(commonly referred to as “pester power” or “pestering”) to influence parents’ 
purchasing behavior (Gunter and Furnham, 1999; McNeal and Mindy, 2003; Nicholls 
and Cullen, 2004) in the context of a lab experiment on real food choices. Thus, we 
contribute to the behavioral economics and health economics literature by examining 
how fiscal policies and external influences (such as pestering and information) can 
affect food choice behavior. Food shopping usually constitutes the first experience 
children in the Western world have of consumer activity, often in conjunction with 
their parents (Cook, 2003). More recent research has also observed that children are 
active participants and influencers in the food decision-making process (Carey et al., 
2008) and that the parent-child conflict is fairly high in supermarket shopping 
environments (Nicholls and Cullen, 2004). A recent survey examined children’s 
pester power in the supermarket environment through intercept interviews and 
concluded that parents often purchase the food that their children demand while in 
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supermarkets despite the fact that the majority of the children’s requests are unhealthy 
(Campbell et al., 2014).  
The question we ask in this paper is whether certain factors can have a moderating 
role on the monetary incentives that food fiscal policies create with respect to parental 
food choice behavior. We examined these effects through the recruitment of 189 
parent-child pairs in a controlled laboratory choice experiment in which we created an 
experimental market with real food products in which parents actually had the 
opportunity to purchase products presented under different pricing schemes. Our 
sample consisted of four within-subjects treatments and four between-subjects 
treatments. In the within-subjects treatments, each participant faced 12 food choice 
tasks.
1
 In each choice task, we displayed two food-for-children products, of the same 
brand and size, with different levels of healthiness (percentage of sugar and fat) and a 
no-buy option. The participants (parents) chose their preferred alternative in each 
choice task. Between choice tasks, the prices varied according to a base level (which 
was selected to reflect the average of market prices) and three different fiscal policies 
levels (i.e., fat tax, subsidy, fat tax and subsidy at the same time). To induce real 
economic incentives, one of the choice tasks was randomly drawn as binding at the 
end of the experiment, and the participant had to buy the food product chosen in the 
binding task or leave with no product if s/he had chosen the no-buy option. In addition 
to the within-subjects treatments, there were four between-subjects treatments. The 
control treatment was as described above. The second treatment (the information 
treatment) was similar to the control treatment but with the addition of information 
regarding the food fiscal policies.
2
 The third treatment (the pester treatment) was 
similar to the control treatment, but now the parent chose together with their child in 
each choice task. The fourth treatment was similar to the pester treatment except that 
                                                 
1
 To cover up the aim of the study and preclude subjects from potentially succumbing to experimenter 
demand effects, two additional non-food categories were added to the list of choice tasks. We used 
stationery products (colored markers, pens/pencils) as decoy products. Consequently, participants faced 
20 choice tasks in total (12 food- and 8 stationery-choice tasks).  
2
 The word tax or subsidy, especially as they relate to food, includes a normative message rather than 
just giving plain information regarding the direction of the price change (upwards or downwards). 
More generally, when fiscal policies are applied, the purchasing behaviour cannot be explained solely 
in terms of a price effect. The nature of the intervention itself could also influence consumer 
preferences (Hilton et al., 2014). The announcement of the implementation of a specific policy to 
participants reflects the nutritional content of the product subject to this policy, i.e., a fat tax for product 
“X” means that the “X” product is probably unhealthy, and this is why it is being taxed. However, this 
is exactly what this study attempts to examine. We provided information about the price change at the 
time of purchase to remind participants about the healthiness of each product alternative. 
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we also offered information to the participants about the food fiscal policies (pester 
plus information treatment).   
Our results make three substantive contributions to the literature. We find that the 
fiscal policy intervention by itself has a moderate effect on parental food choices. In 
particular, we find that a fat tax or a subsidy can increase healthier choices and that 
the simultaneous implementation of both a fat tax and a subsidy can further improve 
healthier choices among parents. Our second result is that when information regarding 
the applied food fiscal policies is available, healthier choices can increase the impact 
of the intervention even further. Therefore, it appears that the lack of proper provision 
of information is one of the causes of the policy’s moderate effectiveness. Third, we 
find that child pestering strongly affects parents in making unhealthier choices. 
The rest of the article proceeds as follows: First, we present the design of the 
experiment and the experimental procedures as well as information about our sample 
and products used in the study (section 2). Section 3 illustrates the results drawn from 
the descriptive and econometric analysis. Section 4 concludes with the importance 
and the implications of the findings.   
 
2 Experiment 
2.1 Experimental Design  
Table 1 exhibits the four within- and four between-subjects treatments of our 
experiment, along with the number of parent-child pairs that participated in each 
treatment. Each cell in the table represents a between-subjects treatment. Within each 
cell, the four within-subjects treatments are listed that correspond to the price 
variations induced by each of the four fiscal policies: (1) a baseline scenario of market 
prices, (2) a fat tax, (3) a subsidy, and (4) a fat tax and subsidy applied simultaneously 
(the “Both” treatment). The between-subjects treatments vary the decision 
environment (the parent goes through the choice tasks with or without the presence of 
the child, which corresponds to the “Pester” and “No Pester” treatments) and 
information provision (whereby the parent is provided with information about the 
fiscal policies or not, hereafter referred to as the “Info” and “No Info” treatments). All 
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sessions were conducted by a single experimenter, i.e., one of the authors, and the 
experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 
 
Table 1. Experimental design 
 
No information for 
fiscal policy 
Information for fiscal 
policy 
Pester power  
47 
Market price, Fat tax, 
Subsidy, Both 
47 
Market price, Fat tax, 
Subsidy, Both 
No Pester power  
47 
Market price, Fat tax, 
Subsidy, Both 
48 
Market price, Fat tax, 
Subsidy, Both 
2.1.1 The role of food fiscal policies  
Our experiment allows us to study the role of food fiscal policies as a tool that can 
influence healthier food purchasing behavior. We varied within subjects the posted 
prices of the products according to four within-subjects treatments. The market price 
(MP) treatment was always displayed first to create a common reference point to all 
subjects so that comparisons can be made with respect to fiscal policy treatments. In 
this treatment, the healthier and unhealthier versions of a product on any given choice 
task were set to the same level. The price level was set to the average value of market 
prices we found in major supermarket chains a few days prior to the experiment. 
Participants were explicitly told that in the first round, they will see the products in 
their average market price (the average price was the same within a product category 
but, naturally, varied between product categories). After the MP treatment, the three 
food fiscal policies (three treatments) followed in random order to avoid order effects. 
The only thing that was varied in these treatments was prices for the products (see 
Table 2). One of the treatments imposed a fat tax on the price of the unhealthier 
product (as judged by the fat or sugar content) while keeping the price of the healthier 
product constant at market price (FT treatment). An additional treatment imposed a 
subsidy on the price of the healthier product, keeping the price of the unhealthier 
product constant at the market price (SB treatment). The third treatment combined a 
fat tax on the price of the unhealthier product with a subsidy on the healthier product 
(BO treatment). The full list of choice tasks displayed in the four within-subjects 
treatments is listed in Appendix A. 
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Table 2. Overview of the within-subjects treatments 
Treatment Description 
Control Treatment 
Prices are set to the average value of market prices of major 
supermarket chains prior to the experiment. The prices of 
the healthier and unhealthier alternatives are equal. 
Fat tax (FT) 
Treatment 
Fat tax on the unhealthier alternative (25% increase on the 
market price) 
Subsidy (SB) 
Treatment 
Subsidy on the healthier alternative (25% decrease on the 
market price) 
Both (BO) 
Treatment 
Fat tax on the unhealthier alternative and subsidy on the 
healthier alternative at the same time (a 25% increase in the 
market price of the unhealthier product and a 25% decrease 
in the market price of the healthier product) 
 
2.1.2 The role of provision of information 
Our rationale for including a (between-subjects) provision of information treatment 
was that information regarding the price change can signal the relation of a price 
change with the healthiness of a product. This in turn can potentially alter purchase 
behavior. Such information provision can be enacted using several methods, including 
mass media, governmental/community-level agent announcements and informative 
labels on the shelves next to the price. In the context of our laboratory experiment, a 
labeling scheme was deemed more realistic when combined with a hypothetical 
governmental announcement. The design tries to mimic the real process of 
implementing a food policy. In Denmark in 2011, the media announced the 
implementation of a fat tax on products with high fat content to address rising obesity 
rates among the Danish and the relatively lower life expectancy. We adopted this 
procedure because we wanted the results of this experiment to be more relevant for 
policy makers. Thus, during the experiment, subjects were asked to imagine a case in 
which the health minister was about to implement a policy to address alarming obesity 
rates among children in the country (see Appendix B). However, we also added one 
more element. We made taxes more salient in terms of the visibility of the applied tax. 
Therefore, in the information treatment, subjects were informed of the actual reason 
for which a price change occurred (e.g., implementation of a fat tax or a subsidy or 
both) using a descriptive label on the top of the screen. We conducted this study in 
Greece, where, as in many other European countries, sales tax is applied to all food 
products (in contrast to many states in the US, where food and non-alcoholic 
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beverages are exempt from sales tax), and the sales tax is included in the posted price 
depicted on the sales tag (that is, one uniform final price is displayed). Therefore, the 
information treatment simulates an environment in which the consumer is informed of 
the price change of the product at the point of purchase through an informative tag. In 
the no-information treatment, subjects were not informed of the actual reason for the 
price increase/decrease. 
 
2.1.3 The role of children’s pester power  
Our second between-subjects treatment examined the effect of parents making joint 
decisions with their child. While a parent may rationally choose to purchase a 
healthier product for their child, going to the supermarket with their child could 
adversely affect purchase decisions if the parent decides to give in to the child’s 
demands (which are likely motivated by factors other than nutrition). To vary the 
child’s ability to potentially pester the parents on their choices (hereafter referred to as 
pester treatments), we allowed children in half of the sessions to participate in the 
experiment with their parent by letting the child sit next to his/her parent. 
In the no-pester treatments, the parent-child pair entered the lab together; however, 
the child stayed in the lobby of the lab and had no knowledge of what happened in the 
main area of the lab where the experiment took place and where the products were on 
display. Parents were told that the child will be kept engaged in the lab’s lobby, where 
the child could watch cartoons or draw using paper and colored pencils. The child was 
told that s/he could watch cartoons or engage in drawing and that her/his parent was 
going to sit close by and within eye-contact distance. All the children were therefore 
restricted to being in the lab lobby, and none was allowed in the lab. Hence, parents 
decided on their own during the experiment without any external influence from the 
child, and the child did not participate in the experiment at all. 
On the other hand, in the pester treatments, the parent-child pairs entered the main 
area of the lab together. The experimenter then instructed both the child and the parent 
to take a good look at the products in the exhibition shelf. They then sat together in 
front of the computer. Because there were no other distractions in the lab, the parent-
child pairs were focused on the experiment and the choices they had to make. The 
child and the parent could freely communicate and discuss the choice options they had 
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to make.
3
 In addition, the experimenter indeed observed that there were interactions 
between each parent-child pair.
4
 The children regularly expressed their opinion when 
the choice alternatives appeared on the computer screen. The experimenter also 
observed that in several cases in the pester treatments, the parents tried to convince 
their child to choose the healthier alternative but that at the end, the child’s nagging 
caused the parents to give in to their child’s demands.  
 
2.2  Participants 
A random sample of families (one adult who is the primary grocery shopper and 
makes the household meal decisions and one child) from the general population of 
Athens, Greece was recruited by a market recruitment research company. The 
research company ensured that the interested families met the following study criteria: 
(1) the child in the family was between the ages of 6 and 10 (if there was more than 1 
child in the family in this particular age range, the company randomly picked one 
child)
5
 and (2) the family consumed the products used in the study moderately or 
more often.
6
 Subjects were offered a fixed fee of 30€ per family to participate in a 
“preference survey for snack and stationery products for children” conducted in the 
experimental economics laboratory of the Agricultural University of Athens. A total 
of 189 families participated in the experiment.
7
 Subjects participated in one of the 
four between-subjects treatments, and they were randomly assigned to a time slot 
between July 2012 and September 2012. Experimental sessions were split between 
morning (97 sessions) and afternoon (92 sessions) snack time hours, i.e., from 9:00-
                                                 
3
 We observed that, in the pester treatments, all the children interacted with their parent. None of the 
children interacted with their parents in the No-Pester treatments. 
4
The experimenter systematically recorded on a sheet of paper whether the pair interacted in any way 
that signalled coordination in the choice made by the parent. This behaviour occurred in every single 
interaction.  
5
 We chose this specific age range because, on the one hand, children of this age range have almost no 
pocket money and are totally dependent on what their parents purchase for them, while, on the other 
hand, they are old enough to accompany parents at the supermarket. 
6
 Parents were screened for consumption patterns from a large list of food and stationery products, 
which included the products used in our study, so that we would avoid any prior associations with the 
aims of the study. 
7
 A total of 195 parent-child pairs were recruited by the research company. Four of them did not show 
up. Two more pairs were excluded from all further analysis because, on one occasion, the parent 
refused to let us take anthropometric measurements from both the chid and the parent; on the other 
occasion the child entered the lab while his mother was making choices for the experiment despite 
several warnings that the child should remain in the lab’s lobby. 
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13:00 and 16:00-20:00 each day of the week except Sundays.
8
 Each parent-child pair 
participated in only one treatment/session. All subjects were given a short orientation 
and training before the experiment begun.  
 
2.3 Experimental procedures  
Each experimental session consisted of four tasks. It included a real choice 
experiment (RCE), a manipulation check questionnaire, a socio-demographic 
questionnaire and anthropometric measurements. In each session, a single parent-child 
pair participated, which lasted approximately 40 minutes. Depending on the treatment, 
the child could have an active role in the choice experiment or not. 
In the RCE task, participants faced different choice tasks for which they had to choose 
between two (similar) products of the same brand (e.g., cheese) differentiated by their 
healthiness status (healthier vs. unhealthier alternative) and price (three levels). The 
healthiness or unhealthiness status was not explicitly labeled as such. Choices also 
included a no-buy option in the event that subjects did not prefer any of the products.
9
  
The experiment was conducted as follows: First, each parent was assigned a unique 
ID number to guarantee his/her anonymity, and s/he was informed that their fixed 
participation fee of 30€ would be given to them at the end of the experiment.10 In 
addition, subjects could examine the products offered for sale in a display section in 
the lab. They were given a sufficient amount of time to see and inspect all products. 
Subjects were then seated in front of a computer, and they were informed that they 
would go through 20 choice tasks displaying various combinations of the products on 
display in the lab.
11
 They were also informed that when they complete all choice 
                                                 
8
 Lunch and dinner time in Greece are usually later than in other parts of Europe and North America. 
Lunch is usually served between 13:30 and 15:00, while dinner is served between 20:00 and 21:30. 
Two parent-child pairs participated in the experiment at 14:00 and 14:45 because they were late and 
early.  
9
 According to Louviere and Street (2000), it is not realistic to force participants to choose one of the 
available options, and therefore including a no-buy option is to be preferred.  
10
 The fixed fee of 30€ per family reflects the opportunity cost of time of 2 people commuting from 
their residence to the university lab to participate in the experiment (round trip tickets for public 
transportation at the time of the experiment cost 5.60€ for 2 persons). This leaves the parent-child pair 
with approximately 25€ of net income, which is comparable to what professional research companies 
use to compensate subjects in the surveys they undertake. Furthermore, because the fixed fee of 30€ did 
not vary across treatments, it should not explain the differences in observed behavior between 
treatments.   
11
 Note that only 12 of 20 choice tasks involved food items. Eight choice tasks involved decoy 
stationery products. 
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tasks, one of these would be chosen as binding, and they would have to purchase the 
product of their choice at the indicated price. The price of the product would be 
deducted from their participation fee. To determine the binding round, subjects had to 
draw a number from a jar with folded papers listing numbers from one to twenty (as 
many as the choice tasks). To make sure parents were choosing food products for their 
child, they were explicitly told that the binding product would be opened and given to 
their child right away, to be consumed while s/he was filling out a socio-demographic 
questionnaire.
12
 We emphasized to subjects that actual payment would occur for the 
binding choice task and that they should evaluate each choice task carefully because 
all tasks were equally likely to become binding. Subjects were also told that choosing 
the “none of these” option (i.e., the no-buy option) is an acceptable choice and that, if 
they had chosen the no-buy option in a binding task, no purchase would be made and 
they would keep their full endowment. The exact instructions given to the participants 
are displayed in Appendix B. 
To confirm that our experiment worked well, i.e., that there was no experimenter 
demand effects and participants adhered to the experimental instructions, we 
incorporated a manipulation check questionnaire right after the choice experiment was 
finished (see Appendix C for more details).
13
 The socio-demographic questionnaire, 
which elicited parental perceptions about their child’s weight status, family dietary 
habits, and family socio-demographics, was filled out by the parents. 
Each session concluded with anthropometric measurements of the parent and the 
child. Physical measurements of body weight and height were obtained from all 
children and their parents (light summer clothing, no shoes). Body weight was 
measured on a leveled platform scale with a beam and movable weights, and body 
height was measured with a wall-mounted stadiometer, to the nearest 0.5 kg and 0.5 
cm, respectively. Body Mass Index (BMI) was computed as weight (in kilograms) 
                                                 
12
 In many cases, when the binding product was a food product, it was consumed by the child while the 
parent was filling in the questionnaire. In a few cases in which the questionnaire was filled out before 
the child had the chance to fully consume the food product (this only happened with the cheese sticks, 
for which the package included 6 pieces individually wrapped), we did let the children take the rest of 
the product home. However, the participants were not informed of this beforehand.  
13
 The results of the manipulation check questionnaire reinforced the validity of our experimental 
results. All subjects in the information treatment responded that their responses were based on the 
information given at the beginning of the session along with what s/he and/or their child wanted and 
were not based on what they thought the experimenter wanted from them. All subjects in the No-Info 
treatment responded that the purpose of the study was to examine consumption patterns for food and/or 
stationery products for children. 
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divided by height (in meters squared), and it was used to classify participants as either 
normal-weight, overweight or obese (Cole et al., 2000; Cole et al., 2007; WHO, 
1995).    
 
2.4 Products and choice tasks  
The food products chosen were products commonly purchased by Greek families as 
snacks for children. In each product category (choco milk beverage, cheese, and 
yogurt), there were two products of the same size and weight that differed only on the 
basis of percentage of calories, fat and sugar, and so it was easy for parents to 
distinguish between the healthier and the unhealthier alternatives (for example, all 
healthier products carried nutritional claims such as “free”, “2%”, “light”). However, 
we did not explicitly mention to the participants if a product would be considered 
more or less healthy. We also did not label any of the products as such. Each choice 
task depicted the alternative products using photo stimuli. To mute any brand effects, 
we chose products of the same brand in each product category; that is, each pair of 
healthier and unhealthier products were of the same brand. One week before the 
official start of the experiment, the experimenter visited the supermarkets of the four 
largest chain stores in the city and collected price information for the products of the 
experiment. The average of these prices was used in the baseline control (market 
price) treatment, and prices for the other within-subjects treatments varied 
accordingly.
14
 
Furthermore, we purposely chose products for which the healthier and unhealthier 
alternatives in each choice task were packages of different colors. The visual elements 
of a brand, such as the colors and illustrations, are the first elements understood and 
memorized by children rather than the specific name of the brand (Kapferer, 1985; 
Richard, 1990). In a study conducted with children from 6 to 11 years old, who were 
asked to draw the cornflakes packages they knew, Rossiter (1976) indicated that 
                                                 
14
 The products were: milko vs. milko free, babybel vs. babybel light, delta yogurt vs. delta yogurt 2%. 
The dairy product category was chosen for our experiment because there are only small price 
differences among the healthier and less healthy options. For well known attributes such as fat and 
calories, dairy manufacturers in Greece no longer price their “healthier” products more expensive than 
their “regular” ones. The Greek dairy market is not an exception. Rao et. al.,(2013) conducted a 
systematic review and meta-analysis of prices of healthier versus less healthy options within a single 
food category and concluded that in the case of dairy products, the price differences are very small 
($0.004). In addition, the purpose of the control treatment was to give a common reference point to 
participants so that comparisons can be made with respect to the fiscal policy treatments. 
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children more easily retained the visual elements of the brand rather than the brand 
name itself. Rossiter (1976) concludes that, while the brand name is an important 
recognition sign, it is intimately associated with children’s age and to the development 
of their verbal memory. In addition, Burros (2005) concludes that television 
advertisements largely influence the food preferences of children under 12 years of 
age. The products used in the experiment were commonly advertised during 
children’s TV programs. Thus, we spent a great deal of time and were careful in 
choosing the specific products for our experiment (illustrating pictures of the products 
can be found in Appendix D).  
To cover up the aim of the study and preclude subjects from potentially succumbing 
to experimenter demand effects, two additional non-food categories were added to the 
list of choice tasks. We used stationery products (colored markers, pens/pencils) as 
decoy products. The prices of the decoy products in the market price (baseline) 
treatment were the average of the range of prices observed in the same supermarkets 
we surveyed for the food items. Decoy products were selected so that their price range 
lied between the lowest and the highest price of the market prices of food products, to 
avoid exposing subjects to any irrelevant price anchors. Prices did not change for the 
decoy products under the fat tax, subsidy and both treatments because the fiscal 
policies were irrelevant for stationery products.  
In all, the real choice experiment incorporated 20 different choice tasks [4 within-
subjects treatments (MP, FT, SB and BO)  5 product categories (3 food and 2 non-
food)]. The choice tasks pertaining to the stationery products will not be further 
analyzed. Appendix D displays the sample choice screens from the market price 
treatment. In the rest of the within-subjects treatments, prices were adjusted 
accordingly.  
 
3 Results 
3.1 Descriptive analysis 
Before proceeding with testing our hypotheses, insights can be gained by looking at 
some descriptive statistics. We first explore whether randomization to treatment 
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worked by testing whether the observable characteristic are balanced across the 
between-subjects treatments (see Table 3).  
With respect to the socio-economic status of families, results indicate that our 
between-subjects treatments do not differ in terms of parent/children age and gender, 
income level, education level, working status, family geographical location residence 
and marital status. Furthermore, given that parent-children pairs would have different 
compositions (i.e., father-son, father-daughter, mother-son, and mother-daughter), a 
question that might arise is whether the proportions of parent-child gender 
combinations differ across the treatments. We cannot reject the null of no difference 
between treatments (Pearson’s χ2 =10.85, p-value=0.29). We also classified 
individuals according to parental weight status using Body Mass Index (WHO, 1995). 
The results of whether the distribution of weight status differs between treatments do 
not reject the null hypothesis, and we obtain a similar null effect if we use the raw 
BMI measurements instead of the BMI categories. As far as child’s weight status is 
concerned, we used the International Obesity Task Force (IOTF) cut offs (Cole et al., 
2000) to categorize children into weight categories, and this does not differ 
significantly between treatments. None of our results changes when we use Centers 
for Disease Control (CDC) cut offs (CDC, 2009) because the distribution of weight 
categories did not significantly change. The results from the use of the raw BMI 
(instead of BMI categories) support the above tests.  
 
Table 3. Test statistics comparing the between-subjects treatments and means of the 
characteristics (standard deviation in parenthesis) for each treatment.   
Observable Characteristics Tests  
Parents’ age ANOVA 
[Trt.1. mean=41.21 (0.72)] 
[Trt.2. mean=40.91 (0.72)] 
[Trt.3. mean=39.55 (0.60)] 
[Trt.4. mean=40.25 (0.91)] 
p-value=0.41 
Parents’ gender Pearson’s χ2=2.51 
[Trt.1. mean=0.53 (0.07)] 
[Trt.2. mean=0.57 (0.07)] 
[Trt.3. mean=0.45 (0.07)] 
[Trt.4. mean=0.44 (0.07)] 
p-value=0.47 
Children’s age ANOVA  
[Trt.1. mean=8.32 (0.21)] 
[Trt.2. mean=8.11 (0.18)] 
p-value=0.86 
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[Trt.3. mean=8.09 (0.21)] 
[Trt.4. mean=8.15 (0.21)] 
Children’s gender Pearson’s χ2=2.35 
[Trt.1. mean=0.59 (0.07)] 
[Trt.2. mean=0.49 (0.07)] 
[Trt.3. mean=0.45 (0.07)] 
[Trt.4. mean=0.48 (0.07)] 
p-value=0.50 
Income level  Kruskal Wallis χ2=1.15 p-value=0.77 
Education level Kruskal Wallis χ2=1.37 p-value=0.71 
Occupation  Pearson’s χ2=7.35 p-value=0.83 
Geographical residence Pearson’s χ2=6.95 p-value=0.96 
Marital status Pearson’s χ2=9.66 p-value=0.38 
Smoking status Pearson’s χ2=5.51 p-value=0.79 
Gender of parent-child pairs Pearson’s χ2=10.85 p-value=0.29 
Parental weight status 
   (Healthy=31%, 
    Overweight=37%, 
    Obese=32%) 
Pearson’s χ2=3.86 p-value=0.69 
Parental BMI ANOVA/Kruskal Wallis 
[Trt.1. mean=28.13 (0.67)] 
[Trt.2. mean=27.86 (0.85)] 
[Trt.3. mean=28.55 (0.78)] 
[Trt.4. mean=27.63 (0.76)]  
p-value=0.85/0.78 
Child’s weight status (CDC) 
   (Healthy=59%, 
    Overweight=22%, 
    Obese=19%) 
Pearson’s χ2=4.29 p-value=0.64 
Child’s weight status (IOTF) 
   (Healthy=61%, 
    Overweight=28%, 
    Obese=11%) 
Fisher’s exact test p-value=0.61 
Child’s BMI  ANOVA/Kruskal Wallis 
[Trt.1. mean=18.23 (0.45)] 
[Trt.2. mean=17.45 (0.43)] 
[Trt.3. mean=18.68 (0.45)] 
[Trt.4. mean=18.12 (0.54)] 
p-value=0.33/0.19 
 
Before moving to the econometric analysis, it is also important to have a first look at 
the raw choices of subjects. Subjects had to choose among three alternatives in each 
choice set. They could select the unhealthier alternative, the healthier alternative or 
none of the two alternatives. Our priors are that if parents are aware that a product for 
children has been taxed because it is unhealthier compared to others, it may 
discourage purchases of it; or if they are aware that a product has been subsidized 
because it is considered healthier than other products, it may enhance purchases of it. 
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Overall, we expect that when information is provided about products for which the 
price has been changed according to some fiscal policy, the purchasing behavior of 
parents would shift to healthier product choices. This hypothesis is confirmed by a 
proportions test when we test for differences in choices when information about fiscal 
policies is provided. For example, while 36% of choices are allocated to the healthier 
alternative in the “No Pester - No Info” treatment, the proportion rises to 72% in the 
“No pester - Info” treatment. This difference is statistically significant when we test 
using a proportions test (p-value<0.001). Similar behavior is observed in the “Pester” 
treatments, in which the choices shift from 21% to 58% to the healthier alternative 
when information about fiscal policies is provided. This is clear-cut evidence that 
communicating the nature of the fiscal policy has a positive and significant effect on 
healthier choices because, in both cases, the percentage of healthier choices more than 
doubles. In fact, from the observed interactions recorded by the experimenter between 
parent-child pairs, the provision of information seems to have given parents an 
argument to present to their children that would support their parental choice of the 
healthier alternative.  
On the other hand, children’s pester power has a negative effect on healthier choices. 
In the “No Info” treatment, which allows the child to be able to communicate 
preferences to the parent, results in a significant decline in healthier purchases from 
36% to 21% (p-value<0.001). Similarly, in the “Info” treatment, healthier choices 
decline from 72% to 58% (p-value<0.001) when children can exercise pester power. 
In summary, we find that information about fiscal policies and pester power can have 
opposite effects. The proportion of healthier choices increases when information is 
provided and children cannot exercise their pester power.   
To illustrate this further, Figure 1 graphs the proportion of healthier and unhealthier 
choices by treatment. The graphs ignore non-choices given the low number 
throughout our experiment (only 20 choices were non-choices of the 2268 choices 
that the 189 subjects made in our experiment). 
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Figure 1. Healthier and unhealthier choices by (between-subjects) treatments 
 
To examine the effect of specific fiscal policies (i.e., fat tax, subsidy or both) on 
healthier choices, Figure 2 displays the proportions of healthier and unhealthier 
choices by fiscal policy. The market price treatments are the benchmark (control 
treatments). It is clear that a) imposing the fat tax or subsidy leads to increased 
healthier choices and b) imposing the fat tax and subsidy at the same time can further 
improve healthier choices. We should emphasize that healthier choices can reach as 
high as 83% of all choices when a fat tax and a subsidy are combined, when subjects 
receive information about fiscal policies, and when children cannot exercise pester 
power. In the case in which information about fiscal policies is provided and there is 
pester power, healthier choices fall to 71%. Finally, it is important to mention that 
even when information is not available and the child is present (the two factors that 
favor unhealthier purchases), the combination of a fat tax and a subsidy produce the 
largest percentage of healthier choices when compared with the other fiscal policies 
(which amounts to 28%).    
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Figure 2. Healthier and unhealthier choices by (within-subjects) treatments 
 
We do not observe large differences in the purchasing behavior between the subgroup 
of fathers and the subgroup of mothers (Figure 3). We hypothesized that fathers give 
in to child nagging more easily than mothers, even when information regarding the 
healthiness of a product is provided. However, the results do not support this 
hypothesis.
15
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 When splitting our sample into subsamples according to different weight household combinations 
(i.e., parent of any weight status with normal weight child versus: (a) obese parents with obese 
children, (b) obese parents with overweight children and (c) overweight parents with overweight 
children; obese parents with obese children versus normal weight status parents with normal weight 
children; obese and overweight parents with obese and overweight children versus normal weight 
status parents with normal weight status children) to test if different subgroups behave differently 
among the within- and between- subjects treatments, the proportion tests indicate no significant 
differences. The linear probability models we estimated also did not produce statistically significant 
interaction terms.    
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Figure 3. Healthier vs. unhealthier choices: fathers and mothers subsamples 
 
 
3.2 Econometric analysis 
To check whether the insights gained from the descriptive analysis above hold under 
the scrutiny of conditional analysis, we estimated a mixed logit model (also referred 
to as the “random parameter logit model” or “mixed multinomial logit model” 
(Hensher et al., 2005)). The mixed logit model solves three primary limitations of the 
standard logit model. It allows for random taste variation, unrestricted substitution 
pattern, and correlation in unobserved factors over time (Train, 2003). McFadden and 
Train (2000) indicated that under mild regularity conditions, a mixed logit model can 
calculate to any degree of accuracy any random utility model of discrete choice.   
We assume that a sampled individual (n = 1,…, Ν) faces a choice among i alternatives 
in each of s choice tasks. The utility associated with each alternative i, as evaluated by 
each individual n in choice task s, is represented by the following model: 
 nis n nis nisU x                          (1) 
where xnis is the full vector of explanatory variables that are observed by the analyst; 
n   is a vector of fixed and random coefficients across individuals parameters; and εnis 
is an i.i.d. extreme value error term.  
In our experiment, the participants were asked to make 12 choices between dairy 
products offered at various pricing levels. The choices can be analyzed using the 
following mixed logit model: 
0 1 2 3 4 5ni+ +nis ni i ni nisU ChocoMilk Cheese Price Info Pester                      (2) 
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where 0ni is the alternative specific constant (ASC) for alternative i; ChocoMilk and 
Cheese are product dummies (Yoghurt is the excluded category); Price is the price of 
the products; Info is a dummy variable for when information about the fiscal policies 
are provided to subjects; and Pester is a dummy variable indicating the treatment for 
which the parent-child pair choose together (allowing the child to exercise pester 
power). 
The coefficient 0ni  captures parent sensitivity to the health attribute, and we model 
this as a random parameter that is triangularly distributed.
16
  The coefficients of Info 
and Pester, which capture consumer sensitivity to information provision and child 
pester power, are modeled as random and triangularly distributed as well. The 
parameters β1, β2, and β3 are non-random and capture consumer sensitivity toward 
product category and price changes. Finally, the alternative-specific constant for the 
“none-of-these” alternative is normalized to zero.  
Table 4 displays the estimated coefficients of the parameters and respective standard 
errors from the estimated model of equation (2) (the column labeled “mixed logit 
(1)”). For comparison, a multinomial logit model is also displayed as well as a mixed 
logit model for which only the alternative specific constants are modeled as random 
(the column labeled “mixed logit (2)”). We can see that both the mixed logit models 
(LL= -1127.017 and LL= -1126.947) are an improvement to the more restrictive 
multinomial logit model (LL=-1394.050). Likelihood ratio tests indicate that the 
mixed logit model (1) is to be preferred to the multinomial logit model (χ2=534.07, p-
value<0.001). A similar result is obtained when we compare the mixed logit model 
(2) with the multinomial logit model (χ2=534.21, p-value<0.001). On the other hand, 
the two mixed logit models do equally well (χ2=0.14, p-value=0.998). AIC values 
support these conclusions. Note that the two mixed models are qualitatively and 
quantitatively indistinguishable in terms of the estimated coefficients.
17
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 We tried several other distributions for the random coefficients of our model such as the normal and 
the uniform distribution. Differences between models with different distributions for the random 
coefficients are negligible. We only report results from the models with triangular distribution because 
it is a limited distribution, and therefore, it does not imply that anyone has an unlimited willingness to 
pay (Alfnes et al., 2006). See Hensher and Greene (2003) for a discussion on the various distributions 
in mixed logit models.   
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 We also estimated models that included a time of the session dummy (morning vs. afternoon 
sessions) to control for time-of-day differences. The dummy for time of the sessions was not  
statistically significant and of small magnitude. In addition, likelihood ratio tests indicate that the 
model with the time-of-day dummy does not significantly improve the fit of the model (χ2=0.928, p-
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The alternative specific constants represent the utility of the alternatives (unhealthier-
healthier) at the base level, and the alternative with the highest utility on the base level 
is the unhealthier alternative, namely, ASCU, which is significantly higher than the 
healthier alternative (Wald test-statistic: χ2=46.69, p-value<0.001). The product 
dummies have no effect on the utilities of the alternatives. Furthermore, the 
coefficient of the Price variable for both the healthier and unhealthier alternatives is 
negative, as one would normally expect.  
The coefficient of the information variable for the healthier alternative is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level, while for the unhealthier alternative, it is not 
statistically significant and of small magnitude. This means that providing information 
about fiscal policies affects the utility of the healthier alternative much more than the 
utility of the unhealthier alternative. A similar pattern in terms of statistical 
significance is observed for the child pester power coefficients. The pester power 
dummy has a negative statistically significant effect for the healthier alternative but is 
not significant and is of small magnitude for the unhealthier alternative.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
value=0.629). Furthermore, we also estimated a mixed logit model that specifies the model so that error 
components in different choice sets from a given individual are correlated (correlated random 
parameters model). However, estimated covariances of random parameters were not statistically 
significant in this model indicating the absence of correlation between random parameters. In addition, 
AIC and Log-Likelihood measures indicated a worse fit than the model without correlated random 
parameters. 
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Table 4. Estimated parameters for the multinomial logit and mixed logit models 
Multinomial logit Mixed logit (1) Mixed logit (2) 
Variable Coefficient S.E. Variable Coefficient S.E. Variable Coefficient S.E. 
ASCU 8.251*** 1.056 ASCU (R) 10.388*** 1.120 ASCU (R) 10.434*** 1.121 
ASCH 7.040*** 1.054 ASCH (R) 8.197*** 1.121 ASCH (R) 8.196*** 1.125 
ChocoMilk -1.621 1.052 ChocoMilk -1.235 1.060 ChocoMilk -1.237 1.060 
Cheese 0.121 1.074 Cheese 1.566 1.099 Cheese 1.562 1.099 
PriceU -2.178*** 0.179 PriceU -3.505*** 0.249 PriceU -3.504*** 0.249 
PriceH -2.348*** 0.217 PriceH -3.756*** 0.294 PriceH -3.755*** 0.294 
InfoU 0.970 0.631 InfoU (R) 0.662 0.703 InfoU 0.606 0.694 
InfoH 2.683*** 0.632 InfoH (R) 3.803*** 0.742 InfoH 3.781*** 0.743 
PesterU 0.061 0.456 PesterU (R) 0.210 0.540 PesterU 0.201 0.540 
PesterH -0.673 0.459 PesterH (R) -1.239** 0.603 PesterH -1.238** 0.593 
Log likelihood -1394.050  -1127.017  -1126.947 
AIC 2808.100  2286.034  2277.894 
N 2268 
    Note: ***, **, * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
    (R): Denotes random coefficient for the respective variable. 
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Given that the estimates of the coefficients from the mixed logit model are hard to 
interpret quantitatively, we also calculated the effect of changes in prices on the 
choice probabilities for each of the alternatives and for each of the between-subjects 
treatments (see Table 5). Because previous analysis indicated little in the way of a 
product-specific effect, we pooled across the products in this table. The results from 
the within-subjects treatments indicate that changing the food fiscal policy from a 
basic level of market price to imposing a 25% fat tax increases choices of the 
healthier alternative by 16.16% and decreases choices of the unhealthier alternative by 
nearly 18%, ceteris paribus. The results from a corresponding subsidy of the healthier 
alternative indicate a 14.5% increase in the probability of selecting the healthier 
alternative and a 14% decrease in the unhealthier alternative, ceteris paribus. The 
combined effect of a fat tax and a subsidy results in even larger changes. The results 
from the between-subjects treatments indicate that the effect of fiscal policies is even 
stronger in increasing the probability of selecting the healthier alternative when 
combined with information. For example, when information regarding the policies is 
provided, a 25% subsidization of the price results in a 49% increase in the healthier 
choice share, and the equivalent fat tax imposed on the unhealthier alternative results 
in a 50% increase in the healthier choice share. This indicates that the fiscal policies 
are more effective if coupled with information carrying a normative messaging.  
Our results also indicate that children can influence parents negatively in choosing the 
healthier alternatives. We observe that even when both fiscal policies are applied (the 
treatment for which we have the larger shares for the healthier alternatives) and 
parents make choices together with their child, the probability of selecting healthier 
products does not exceed 13%, ceteris paribus. However, based on the percentages 
from the Pester – Info treatment, we can see an increase of up to 47% in healthier 
choices when information is provided. When we compare differences between the 
effectiveness of a fat tax and a subsidy, we conclude that these are rather small, at 
least in the context of our experiment. 
 
Table 5. Scenario of fiscal policies (25% increase – 25% decrease) and their effects 
on choice probabilities (%) compared to the control (market price) treatment 
 
MARKET 
PRICE 
FAT TAX SUBSIDY BOTH 
No Pester – No Info 
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U 
BASELINE 
 
-17.91 -14.01 -30.75 
H 16.16 14.52 30.49 
N 1.74 -0.51 0.26 
No pester - Info 
U -36.95 -48.96 -47.73 -55.82 
H 38.08 49.97 48.96 57.02 
N -1.13 -1.01 -1.23 -1.20 
Pester – No Info 
U 14.23 -1.95 2.92 -14.34 
H -14.53 -1.10 -2.74 13.02 
N 0.30 3.05 -0.18 1.32 
Pester - Info 
U -20.16 -35.79 -33.66 -46.10 
H 21.15 36.47 34.80 47.14 
N -0.99 -0.68 -1.14 -1.04 
Note: H: Healthier alternative, U: Unhealthier alternative, N: None of these 
Fat Tax: 25% Increase in price of unhealthier alternatives from market price, SB: 25% decrease in price 
of healthier alternatives from market price, BO: Change in price from market price for both policies. 
 
 
4 Conclusion  
Given the rapid rise in obesity rates, especially among children, policymakers and 
academics have proposed a large number of policy measures to halt or reverse this 
trend. Some of the most well-known mechanisms are food fiscal policies, which may 
be used to encourage consumers to adopt a healthier way of eating. In this paper, we 
studied how food fiscal policies and external influences (such as pestering and 
information) can affect parental choice of food for their child. This is important given 
that adult eating habits are acquired during childhood (Birch, 1988; Kelder et al., 
1994; Lien et al., 2001). Thus, children are more likely to adopt healthier eating 
behavior if they grow up under a healthy parental food “umbrella”. We focused on 
parental food choices because young children’s choices are normally constrained by 
what their parents provide them. In this study, we perceive food fiscal policies as a 
promising incentive mechanism that could create a parental environment that supports 
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healthy eating in the family. However, specific factors that influence the effectiveness 
of food fiscal policies have to be taken into account. 
From an economics perspective, this study tries to simulate the choices parents face in 
real world settings using a real choice experiment. Choice experiments are an 
incentive-compatible method that is easy for consumers to understand. In our 
experiment, subjects were tested in a “closed environment” as they could only choose 
between three alternatives: a healthier and an unhealthier version of the same product 
category, brand and size or the no-buy option. Although in real life, a far greater 
number of options (brands, sizes, substitutes) are available in a grocery store, which 
can create more complex substitution patterns resulting from fiscal policies, our 
small-scale choice environment provides a clean illustration of the effects of these 
policies.  
In terms of policy making, our study illustrates that the magnitude of the effect of any 
fiscal policy can be weakened or enhanced by several other factors. For example, our 
study demonstrates the significant (negative) influence that children exert on parental 
choice decisions (i.e., with pestering) in regard to healthier foods. On the other hand, 
our findings suggest that if proper provision of information regarding the cause of the 
price increase/decrease is provided (e.g., posted information tags regarding the 
applied policy on the shelf close to the price), the effect of a food fiscal policy can be 
enhanced. This finding implies that food fiscal policies are more effective if coupled 
with information (that may carry normative messages) directly on the product so that 
the policy becomes more salient at the time of purchase. Furthermore, our results 
indicate that, although there is an impact on healthier choices after the implementation 
of a fat tax or a subsidy, the simultaneous implementation of the fat tax and subsidy 
can further encourage healthier choices.
18
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 We acknowledge that a different experimental design in which the subject overall income is adjusted 
by a certain percent after a fat tax or a subsidy would have allowed us to control for income effects and 
would have given us the opportunity to present income adjusted results for the within-subjects 
treatments. Furthermore, experimenter demand and house money effects may be present as in many 
experiments. However, we did everything in our power (including anonymity and manipulation 
checks) to avoid these potential sources of bias. Even if the effects on the tendency to purchase 
unhealthier options are at the lower bounds, we are for the most part interested in the between-subjects 
comparisons of these effects. Thus, the pestering effect (which was identified on the basis of a 
between-subjects design) does not necessarily reflect a lower bound. As for the house money effect, 
although there is much evidence of the house money effect in bargaining games, it is not clear how 
these results would extend to market games and more importantly to market choice experiments. All in 
all, this paper’s purpose was to identify the factors that enhance or decrease food fiscal policy 
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Overall, one of the ways to gain public acceptance for a fiscal policy that involves 
price increases is to convince consumers that revenues from the difference in the 
payable price will be returned to them. This could be done with the implementation of 
subsidies to products considered healthier, ensuring that food taxes are not regressive; 
through educational programs related to healthy eating behavior among adults and 
children; through public information campaigns and fitness equipment/parks available 
to the public; as well as through funding of the public health system. For example, 
Reger et al. (1999) reported that after a six-week mass media campaign and 
implementation of media public relation strategies in East Virginia to encourage 
consumers to switch from whole-fat milk (2%) to low-fat milk (1%), there was a 17% 
rise in low-fat milk purchases. This effect lasted at least six months after the 
intervention ended.    
Given the context upon which this study was conducted (i.e., in Greece), future 
research should test the robustness of our findings in other countries where parenting 
styles, family structures, and eating culture might differ.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
effectiveness. Thus, these caveats do not affect the between-subjects comparisons of the treatments 
and, hence, the results regarding the information and pestering treatments.  
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Appendix A: Full list of choice tasks  
  
Price of 
unhealthier 
alternative 
Price of 
healthier 
alternative 
No-Buy 
Alternative 
Product 
category 
Choice task 1: 1.3 1.3 None of these 
Choco Milk 
Beverage 
Choice task 2: 1.62 1.3 None of these 
Choice task 3: 1.3 0.98 None of these 
Choice task 4: 1.62 0.98 None of these 
Choice task 5: 2 2 None of these 
Cheese 
Choice task 6: 2.5 2 None of these 
Choice task 7: 2 1.5 None of these 
Choice task 8: 2.5 1.5 None of these 
Choice task 9: 1 1 None of these 
Yogurt 
Choice task 10: 1.25 1 None of these 
Choice task 11: 1 0.75 None of these 
Choice task 12: 1.25 0.75 None of these 
Choice task 13: 1.5 1.5 None of these 
Decoy 
Markers 
Choice task 14: 1.5 1.5 None of these 
Choice task 15: 1.5 1.5 None of these 
Choice task 16: 1.5 1.5 None of these 
Choice task 17: 1.2 1.2 None of these 
Decoy 
Pencils 
Choice task 18: 1.2 1.2 None of these 
Choice task 19: 1.2 1.2 None of these 
Choice task 20: 1.2 1.2 None of these 
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Appendix B: Experimental Instructions 
[This is an English translation of the original instructions written in Greek. Text in 
brackets was not shown to subjects.] 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this survey. This study is a preference 
survey for snack and stationery products for children.  
 
Υou have been randomly assigned a participant identity number (ID). You will use 
this ID to identify yourself. The ID must be written on the computer screen and on all 
papers handed in today. All information collected is strictly confidential and will only 
be used for this specific project.  
 
Your participation fee is 30€. You will receive a voucher with a value of 30€. The 
voucher can be exchanged for money when you have completed all parts of the study. 
During the study, you will be able to make real purchases if you wish to. I will give 
you more details on this part later on. The cost of any purchases you make will be 
deducted from the 30€ participation fee.   
 
If you have any questions, you may ask the moderator.  
 
[Depending on the treatment, the experimenter enters the computer lab with the parent 
only or with the parent and the child together. Children that are not participating in the 
real choice experiment in treatments 1 and 3 spend their time in the lobby of the 
computer lab within eye-contact distance from their parents. These children can watch 
cartoons or draw using paper and pencils.] 
 
The first thing I want you to do is to examine all the products in this product display. 
You can see 5 product categories: milk drink, cheese, yogurt, pencils and markers. As 
you can see, the products within a product category are of the same size and of the 
same brand.  
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[For treatments 2 and 4, for which fiscal policy information was made available, the 
following paragraph was read to the participants while they were examining the 
products:]  
“As you can see, there are five product categories, and each category has two products 
of the same size and brand but with different fat and sugar ingredient content. Now 
imagine that the health minister makes the following announcement in the mass 
media: Due to the alarming obesity prevalence rates among children in our country, 
we decided to apply the following food fiscal policies on dairy products that are 
commonly consumed by children. Beginning next week, we will impose 3 different 
fiscal policies. The first, which is called the fat tax, will increase the price of the 
product that is considered unhealthier by 25%; the second, which is called the 
subsidy, will decrease the price of healthier products by 25%; and the third will 
combine a fat tax with a subsidy, i.e., there will be a simultaneous increase in the 
price of the unhealthier product of 25% and a 25% decrease in the price of the 
healthier product.] 
 
[Subject is then seated in front of a computer] 
The products that were on display are going to appear on your screen in dyads. In 
total, you will go through 20 choice tasks. Between tasks, different products will 
appear, but you might also see the same products at various price levels. In each 
choice task, you can choose between any of the two products, or you can choose the 
no-buy option by selecting the “none of these” alternative.  
 
When you complete all choice tasks, one of the choice tasks will be randomly selected 
as a binding task, and you will have to purchase the product/alternative that you chose 
in this choice task. The price of the purchased product will be deducted from your 
participation fee. If you chose the “none of these” option in the binding choice task, 
you will not purchase any product, and the full participation fee will be given to you. 
The random draw for the binding task will be performed in front of you using this jar. 
The jar contains folded papers listing numbers from one to twenty (as many as the 
choice tasks). That is, each choice task has a one-out-of-twenty chance (5%) of being 
 35 
binding. More importantly, all tasks are equally likely to be selected as binding. 
Today, you will purchase at most one product. The purchased product will be given to 
your child to be consumed while you participate in the second part of this survey, 
which is a socio-demographic questionnaire.   
 
Are there any questions? 
[If there are no questions, the experimenter proceeds with starting the computerized 
treatment, and the subject is instructed to proceed with the choice task.] 
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Appendix C: Manipulation Check Questionnaire  
1. Did you enjoy participating? 
2. Were you bored at any point? 
3. Do you have an idea about what was the purpose of the experiment? 
4. Did you choose based on the information provided to you at the beginning of the 
experiment?  
5. Did you respond based on what you think the experimenter wanted from you 
because you think that the experimenter could see your answers? 
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Appendix D: Example decision tasks for the market price treatment.  
[This is an English version of the original screens that appeared in Greek for the 
market price treatment. Similar screens were displayed for the fat tax, subsidy and 
both treatments with appropriate price adjustments.] 
Choice Task 1
Price: 1.3€
Choose the left choice Choose the right choice
None of these
Confirm
Price: 1.3€
 
Choice Task 2
Price: 1€
Choose the left choice Choose the right choice
None of these
Confirm
Price: 1€
 
Choice Task 3
Price: 2€
Choose the left choice Choose the right choice
None of these
Confirm
Price: 2€
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Choice Task 4
Price: 1.5€
Choose the left choice Choose the right choice
None of these
Confirm
Price: 1.5€
 
Choice Task 5
Price: 1.2€
Choose the left choice Choose the right choice
None of these
Confirm
Price: 1.2€
 
 
 
